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Toward a Compensatory Model of
Alimony in Alaska
The Alaska Supreme Court has traditionally avoided awarding
alimony in determining how to divide marital resources at divorce.
This note argues that this predisposition has led the court to
develop an analytical framework for reviewing trial court alimony
awards that is anchored in faulty statutory construction and that
fails to account adequately for the economic and social disloca-
tions that disproportionately impact women upon divorce This
note also describes the consistency with which the supreme court
has remanded recent alimony decisions and argues that this trend
reflects the court's aversion to awarding alimony and unnecessari-
ly exacerbates the harmful effects of divorce on women. This note
concludes by offering an alternative, and more equitabl4 legal and
philosophical model that abandons the current needs-based
approach to allocating alimony in favor of an approach that
focuses on compensation for lost earning capacity.
I. INTRODUCTION
Cases of marital dissolution-including questions of property
division, child support, and alimony-are the most frequently
litigated issues before the Alaska Supreme Court. During the last
two years, such cases comprised between fifteen and twenty percent
of the appeals brought before the court.' This note specifically
addresses the issue of alimony, which the court traditionally has
avoided awarding in resolving divorce cases.
The Alaska Supreme Court's interpretive approach to the
award of post-dissolution spousal support is far more narrow than
either the controlling statute2 warrants or the economic realities
that face women after divorce seem to require. As a consequence,
the resolution of alimony cases often yields inequitable results.
Part I of this note first describes the devastating economic
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1. Telephone Interview with Jan Hansen, Clerk of the Appellate Courts of
Alaska (Nov. 2, 1994).
2. ALASKA STAT. § 25.24.160(a)(2) (1991).
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consequences of divorce for women, particularly for women exiting
long-term marriages.' It then examines the Alaska Supreme
Court's aversion to permanent alimony and concludes that this
aversion reveals the court's myopic assumption that simple property
division or temporary forms of alimony can adequately address the
profound financial impact of divorce on women. Part II explores
the court's recurring insistence on remanding awards of alimony to
the trial court for further specific findings and argues that this trend
imposes undue burdens and costs on the litigants in divorce cases.
Finally, part III suggests that a theoretical shift-from focusing on
the specific needs of the claimant to an understanding of how the
claimant's loss of future earning capacity during marriage defines
such needs-will yield more equitable and consistent alimony
judgments and mitigate the frustration that has plagued practitio-
ners, litigants and judges alike in this area.
A. Background: The Economic Consequences of Divorce for
Women
A large body of research confirms that divorce carries
devastating economic consequences for women.4 Indeed, "house-
holds headed by divorced and separated mothers constitute the
fastest growing segment of the American poor."5 In her frequently
cited study on divorce, Lenore Weitzman concluded:
3. The note limits its discussion of alimony to awards for women. This is not
to suggest that alimony is a remedy available solely to women, nor that men
categorically cannot assert meritorious alimony claims. Indeed, a hallmark of
modem divorce law is its gender neutrality. See On v. On, 440 U.S. 268 (1979)
(striking down a state statute prohibiting males from receiving alimony because it
was based on a gendered stereotype of marital roles). Nonetheless, "as a factual
matter, alimony is claimed almost exclusively by wives, who are more likely to be
economically dependent." IRA M. ELLMAN ET AL., FAMILY LAW: CASES, TExT,
PROBLEMS 264 (2d ed. 1991). A survey of alimony decisions in Alaska confirms
this proposition. Thus, the case of men seeking alimony, while not ruled out,
simply seems too rare to warrant separate treatment here.
4. See, e.g., LENORE WEMAN, THE DIVORCE REVOLUTION: THE
UNEXPECrED SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES FOR WOMEN AND
CHILDREN IN AMERICA (1985); James B. McLindon, Separate But Unequal: The
Economic Disaster of Divorce for Women and Children, 21 FAM. L.Q. 351 (1987);
Heather R. Wishik, Economics of Divorce: An Exploratory Study, 20 FAM. L.Q.
79 (1986).
5. Jana B. Singer, Divorce Reform and GenderJustice, 67 N.C. L. REV. 1103,
1103 (1989).
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For most women and children, divorce means precipitous
downward mobility-both economically and socially. The
reduction in income brings residential moves and inferior
housing, drastically diminished or nonexistent funds for recre-
ation and leisure, and intense pressures due to inadequate time
and money... . On a societal level, divorce increases female
and child poverty and creates an ever-widening gap between the
economic well-being of divorced men, on the one hand, and their
children and former wives on the other.6
In Alaska, a recent study by the Alaska Women's Commission
found that "[d]ivorced women and their children experienced a 33
percent decline in per capita income resulting in a radical down-
ward shift in their standard of living."7 By comparison, divorced
men in Alaska witnessed a seventeen percent rise in their per
capita incomes.8 Moreover, these consequences are particularly
acute in Alaska because divorce is so prevalent: the divorce rate
in Alaska is sixty-three percent, compared to the national rate of
forty-six percent.9
The Commission also noted the more general phenomenon
that in many marriages, "the couple's major investments are in the
education and career of the primary wage earner, usually the
husband. Yet, the division of marital property often excludes
career assets. Disregarding this property allows ... the husband
... to keep what are often the most valuable assets of the
marriage.'
10
B. The Alaska Supreme Court's Treatment of Alimony
1. The Statutory Scheme. Over thirty years ago, the Alaska
Supreme Court enumerated the criteria that were to guide trial
courts in resolving spousal support disputes." These so-called
6. WErrZMAN, supra note 4, at 323.
7. BARBARA BAKER, ALASKA WOMEN'S COMMIssION, FAMILY EQuiTY AT
IssuE: A STUDY OF THE ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF DIVORCE ON WOMEN
AND CHILDREN i (1987). The Commission's study is based on data collected
between 1984 and 1985. Anchorage, where over half of the divorces in Alaska
occur each year, was selected as the study site. Md
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. IM
11. See Merrill v. Merrill, 368 P.2d 546,547-48 n.4 (Alaska 1962). These same
factors are also considered by trial courts in determining the division of property
between the parties. See ALASKA STAT. §§ 25.24.160(a)(4)(A)-(I) (1991).
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Merrill factors are essentially codified in Alaska Statute section
25.24.160(a)(2)." In divorce actions in Alaska, "the trial court is
vested with broad discretion to award spousal support 'as may be
just and necessary.""' 3 The 1990 amendments added language to
section 25.24.160(a)(2) instructing courts that a maintenance award
"must fairly allocate the economic effect of divorce." However, the
legislative history indicates that the 1990 amendments were not
meant to effect any dramatic changes in the adjudication of
alimony cases. Rather, the legislature intended to "restate the
principal factors found in the case law, not to change them, affect
the interpretation given to them, or preclude changes or additions
to them by other court rulings.' 14
2. The Court's Aversion to Permanent Alimony. No principle is
more firmly embedded in the Alaska Supreme Court's family law
jurisprudence than that, where the marital assets will permit, trial
courts are to provide for the post-dissolution financial needs of the
parties through the division of property rather than alimony. This
principle, while not reflected in the express language of the statute
12. ALASKA STAT. § 25.24.160(a)(2) (1991) provides in pertinent part:
(a) In a judgment in an action for divorce or action declaring a marriage
void or at any time after judgment, the court may provide
i2) for the recovery by one party from the other of an amount of money
for maintenance, for a limited or indefinite period of time, in gross or in
installments, as may be just and necessary without regard to which of the
parties is in fault; an award of maintenance must fairly allocate the
economic effect of divorce by being based on a consideration of the
following factors:
(A) the length of the marriage and station in life of the parties during the
marriage;
(B) the age and health of the parties;
(C) the earning capacity of the parties, including their educational
backgrounds, training, employment skills, work experiences, length of
absence from the job market, and custodial responsibilities for children
during the marriage;
(D) the financial condition of the parties, including the availability and
cost of health insurance;
(E) the conduct of the parties, including whether there has been
unreasonable depletion of marital assets;
(F) the division of property under (4) of this subsection; and
(G) other factors that the court determines to be relevant in eachindividual case ....
13. Hanlon v. Hanlon, 871 P.2d 229, 232 (Alaska 1994) (quoting ALASKA
STAT. § 25.24.160(a)(2)).
14. Act effective Sept. 12,1990, ch. 130, § 1, 1990 Alaska Sess. Laws 1; see also
Jones v. Jones, 835 P.2d 1173, 1178 n.7 (Alaska 1992).
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itself, has been asserted repeatedly by the court and represents the
traditional starting point for a review of trial court spousal support
awards.'" Where the court determines that the property available
for division can adequately satisfy the reasonable needs of the
claimant, it deems alimony payments to be violative of the
requirement of section 25.24.160(a)(2) that all awards be "just and
necessary.' 16 As a corollary to this guiding principle, the court
has enunciated the policy that awards of permanent alimony are
particularly disfavored. 7 This policy is grounded in the rationale
that "it is generally undesirable to require one person to support
another on a long-term basis in the absence of an existing legal
relationship."' 8
Moreover, the Alaska Supreme Court has in the past found
support for its approach in the demanding standards embodied in
the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act ("UMDA"), which provide
that a claimant will be eligible for alimony only if that spouse: "(1)
lacks sufficient property to provide for his reasonable needs; and
(2) is unable to support himself through appropriate employment
or is the custodian of a child whose condition or circumstances
make it appropriate that the custodian may not be required to seek
employment outside the home."'" Professor Homer Clark, a
prominent family law scholar, has identified the UMDA as
comprising part of the "contemporary body of opinion which holds
that alimony has few or no useful functions and therefore ought
15. See, e.g., Richmond v. Richmond, 779 P.2d 1211, 1215 (Alaska 1989);
Miller v. Miller, 739 P.2d 163,164 (Alaska 1987); Nelson v. Nelson, 736 P.2d 1145,
1147 (Alaska 1987); Schanck v. Schanck, 717 P.2d 1, 5 (Alaska 1986); Malone v.
Malone, 587 P.2d 1167,1168 (Alaska 1978); Messina v. Messina, 583 P.2d 804,804-
05 (Alaska 1978).
16. Hilliker v. Hilliker, 755 P.2d 1111, 1112 (Alaska 1988).
17. See Hanlon, 871 P.2d at 233. Alaska is not alone in this respect. Florida,
for instance, with the advent of no-fault divorce and the principle of equitable
distribution, has likewise seen the "virtual abandonment of permanent alimony."
REPORT OF THE FLORIDA SUPREME COURT GENDER BIAS STUDY COMMISSION
56 (1990) [hereinafter FLORIDA STUDY].
18. Jones, 835 P.2d at 1179.
19. UNIF. MARRIAGE AND DIvORCE Acr § 308(a), 9A U.L.A. 347-48 (1973);
see also Schanck, 717 P.2d at 5 n.10 (citing with approval the Commissioner's
Comment to section 308 of the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act); Messina, 583
P.2d at 805 (incorporating into the "just and necessary" inquiry the Commis-
sioner's Comment to section 308 that courts should "provide for the financial
needs of the spouses by property disposition rather than by an award of
maintenance").
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either to be abolished or very strictly limited."2 Another com-
mentator has remarked that, rather than providing compensation
for the female spouse's diminished earning capacity at divorce, "the
UMDA creates a duty to find a job."2"
The deeply rooted preference for property division can claim
some support in the principles of equitable distribution of marital
property that were a hallmark of the no-fault divorce reform era.
Yet "because men usually have a greater earning potential, women
are disadvantaged by 'equitable' distribution [because] marital
assets are [often] too slight to provide sufficient income."'  In
fact, most divorcing couples have minimal tangible property
available for division at divorce,' and "few couples have signifi-
cant debt-free property."'24  Additionally, although a strong
argument can be made that the spouses' earning capacities
represent the primary financial assets of the marriage,z2 earning
capacity is not recognized by the Alaska courts as subject to
equitable property division at divorce. 26  Thus the large-scale
judicial preference in Alaska for property division rather than
longer-term alimony awards imposes disproportionate hardship on
formerly dependent wives. As one commentator stated in a more
general context, "[b]ecause courts generally do not recognize career
assets as marital property, current property division rules, even
those that ostensibly require an equal division of marital assets, do
not result in anywhere near an equal sharing of the fruits of most
marriages."27
3. Rehabilitative and Reorientation Alimony. In an atmo-
sphere that Professor Clark has described as the "contemporary
20. HOMER CLARK, THE LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN THE UNiTED
STATES § 16.4, at 643 (2d ed. 1988).
21. Jane Rutheford, Duty in Divorce: Shared Income as a Path to Equality, 58
FORDHAM L. REv. 539, 564 (1990).
22. FLORIDA STUDY, supra note 17, at 80.
23. See WErrZMAN, supra note 4, at 55; McLindon, supra note 4, at 384; see
also CLARK, supra note 20, § 16.1, at 621 ("[It is clear that only a small
proportion of divorces involve enough property to be of any benefit to the
spouses.").
24. Rutheford, supra note 21, at 575 (citations omitted).
25. See WErrZMAN, supra note 4, at xiii; FLORIDA STUDY, supra note 17, at
61-62; Rutheford, supra note 21, at 575 ("The real asset of most Americans is their
earning capacity.").
26. See ALASKA STAT. § 25.24.160(a)(4) (1991).
27. Singer, supra note 5, at 1115.
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hostility to alimony,"' courts have sought ways to restrict
amounts of spousal support payments and to limit the duration of
such awards. Data collected by the Alaska Women's Commission
suggest that Alaska is representative of this trend; in its 1986
survey, the Commission found that alimony was granted in only ten
percent of the cases studied. Moreover, awards "usually lasted for
only one year and provided an average of only $500 a month,
despite the fact that most [women] who received [alimony] have no
job, no other income or are of an age which makes it difficult to
find paid work."'29 Courts most frequently turn to "rehabilitative
alimony," which seeks to encourage the alimony claimant, usually
the wife and former homemaker, to pursue job-training and
education. The presumption is that such training will lead to steady
employment and self-sufficiency.30
The Alaska Supreme Court held in Jones v. Jones31 that
rehabilitative alimony is appropriate where "the recipient spouse
intends to apply the alimony toward job training designed to lead
to employment."32  But in keeping with the court's general
aversion to spousal support payments, the exception for rehabilita-
tive alimony is narrow in its application, both in terms of its general
scope and specific duration.33 While a trial court may award
rehabilitative alimony even in cases where it determines the parties'
needs will be adequately met through the preferred division of
marital property, "rehabilitative alimony is properly limited to job
training or other means directly related to the end of securing for
one party a source of earned income."' The court has held that
an award of rehabilitative alimony "does not create a continuing
28. CLARK, supra note 20, § 16.4, at 650.
29. Baker, supra note 7, at ii.
30. See generally Joan M. Krauskopf, Rehabilitative Alimony: Uses and Abuses
of Limited Duration Alimony, 21 FAM. L.Q. 573 (1988).
31. 835 P.2d 1173 (Alaska 1992).
32. Id. at 1178-79.
33. Again, Alaska is not unique in this regard. Weitzman argues that the shift
from more traditional permanent alimony awards to short-term or transitional
payments signifies "[tihe most important change in the pattern of alimony awards
following the introduction of no-fault divorce." WErrzMAN, supra note 4, at 164.
34. Schanck v. Schanck, 717 P.2d 1, 5 (Alaska 1986); see also Carlson v.
Carlson, 722 P.2d 222, 225 (Alaska 1986); cf. Bays v. Bays, 807 P.2d 482, 485
(Alaska 1991) (observing that the preference for meeting parties' needs through
property division does not apply to rehabilitative alimony or support of limited
duration).
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legal obligation to provide for the reasonable needs of a former
dependent spouse,"35 and "should not be awarded to a spouse
who refuses to use it for its intended purpose."36
Moreover, the court in recent years has placed a heavy burden
on the spouse seeking an award of rehabilitative alimony: he or
she must submit a "cost estimate of the rehabilitative plan, as well
as an approximation of the economic benefit that is expected. It
is necessary that the person receiving rehabilitative alimony will
improve employability as a result of the plan."'37 The court also
applies what appears to be heightened scrutiny in its review of
rehabilitative awards. In Dixon v. Dixon, 8 for example, the wife,
following an eighteen-year marriage and seven years of being
employed as a bookkeeper, was pursuing an associate's degree in
accounting on a part-time basis.39 The trial court specifically
found that Sheri Dixon was "taking courses to improve her earning
capacity and ... need[ed] spousal maintenance for a period to
realize her potential and to allow her to grow professionally, as she
helped [her husband] to grow and develop."4 Sheri Dixon also
submitted an educational plan according to which she would take
three units per semester towards the fifty-four she needed to earn
her accounting degree.4
Despite the trial court's findings, and Sheri Dixon's demon-
strated intention to apply the alimony toward job training as the
case law requires,4 2 the supreme court held that she had "not
presented a sufficiently detailed course plan and degree goal to
justify an award of 'rehabilitative alimony."'43 Even more remark-
35. Musgrove v. Musgrove, 821 P.2d 1366, 1369 (Alaska 1991).
36. Miller v. Miller, 739 P.2d 163, 165 (Alaska 1987).
37. Ulsher v. Ulsher, 867 P.2d 819, 822 n.5 (Alaska 1994).
38. 747 P.2d 1169 (Alaska 1987).
39. Id. at 1170, 1173.
40. Id. at 1173. The trial court further found that Mr. Dixon earned a net
monthly salary of $4,900, while Mrs. Dixon earned $1,400 net per month and
testified to having monthly expenses of over $3,600. Id. at 1170.
41. Id. at 1173.
42. For an example of what the case law requires, see supra note 36 and
accompanying text.
43. Dixon, 747 P.2d at 1173. For a contrasting conclusion, see Ulsher v.
Ulsher, 867 P.2d 819, 820-21 & nn. 2-3 (Alaska 1994) (affirming a rehabilitative
alimony award for a five-year educational plan that was no more detailed than the
one dismissed in Dixon) and Bussell v. Bussell, 623 P.2d 1221,1224 (Alaska 1981)
(affirming, in the absence of any educational plan, a rehabilitative award of $300
per week for one year, based on the trial court's determination that such an award
108 [Vol. 12:1
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able, the court concluded that Sheri's plan "will not prevent her
from working full-time and therefore cannot justify the trial court's
substantial award of $800 per month for two years and $600 per
month for an additional two years."'  Such analysis is particularly
questionable and inequitable in light of the fact that Sheri had
primary custodial responsibility for the couple's fifteen-year-old
daughter. It also suggests that the court was sympathetic to her ex-
husband's arguments that "since Sheri did not testify that she
intended to decrease her work time in order to increase her school
time, alimony should be limited to ... the cost of her tuition and
books" and that "the support awarded ... would provide Shed
with a financial windfall."'45
The court's treatment of rehabilitative alimony, as illustrated
by Dixon, is problematic for two reasons. First, it reveals the
court's improper application of the controlling statute.' Second,
it relies on the myopic assumption that such awards, which by
definition are limited in amount and duration, can adequately
address the profound financial impact of divorce on women. While
the purposes behind the award are unobjectionable, the way
rehabilitative alimony is reviewed by the Alaska Supreme Court
reflects the judicial misconception that formerly dependent spouses
can be quickly trained and integrated into the work force, and
attain appropriate levels of self-sufficiency.47 The plain fact,
however, is that few homemakers, divorced after a substantial
period of marriage, will ever be able to secure the kind of employ-
would enable the wife to "improve her commercial, secretarial and bookkeeping
skills").
44. Dixon, 747 P.2d at 1173.
45. Id. The court conceded, however, that "[a]n alimony award of limited
duration designed to aid Sheri in reorienting her lifestyle to her new financial
circumstances may be appropriate," id. at 1173, and remanded the case for
"specific findings regarding the propriety of either a rehabilitative or reorientation
alimony award and the proper amount thereof," id. at 1174.
46. See discussion infra part II. Dixon is noted, infra note 93, as an example
of the court's tendency to remand cases for more specific factual findings, even
when the trial court's findings were guided precisely by the factors enumerated in
section 25.24.160(a)(2) of Alaska Statutes.
47. The Florida Supreme Court Gender Bias Study Commission observed that
older divorced women "encounter a legal system that assumes a few years of
rehabilitative alimony will permit them to go out into the world and attain a
standard of living commensurate with that of their married life," which turns out
to be a "cruel joke." FLORIDA STUDY, supra note 17, at 48.
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ment necessary to recover their lost financial standing." One
might infer from Alaska case law that time-limited rehabilitative
alimony has been seized upon as much to relieve the obligor
husband from continuing, indefinite financial obligations as to
encourage formerly dependent spouses to obtain education and job
skills.49 However, as one commentator has noted, "[t]ime limits
always have the potential for leaving a large, unmet gap between
reasonable needs and income of the recipient."5  The court's
approach to rehabilitative alimony, then, when examined within the
broader context of its hostility to more permanent awards, reveals
an analytical framework that disadvantages the formerly dependent
female spouse, particularly the traditional homemaker in a long-
term marriage.5
The Alaska Supreme Court has also recognized another
narrow exception to its general aversion to alimony for what it
terms "reorientation alimony." This type of alimony is "inherently
transitional"'52 and is intended "to allow the requesting spouse an
opportunity to adjust to the changed financial circumstances
accompanying a divorce." 3  Unlike an award of rehabilitative
alimony, reorientation alimony must be predicated on a finding that
"the property settlement will not adequately meet the parties'
reasonable needs."'  While the court generally states that
reorientation alimony may "properly be awarded only for relatively
short periods of time,"'5 it in effect imposes a severely restrictive
cap on the duration of such an award, remarking that "it is difficult
to imagine circumstances under which an award of reorientation
alimony extending for longer than one year would be justified."56
Rehabilitative and reorientation alimony may be awarded
simultaneously. Thus, the court has held that "[a]lthough reorien-
tation and rehabilitative alimony serve separate goals, require
48. Ira M. Ellman, The Theory of Alimony, 77 CAL. L. REV. 1, 19 (1989).
49. See Krauskopf, supra note 30, at 574. Along these lines, one might also
detect an undercurrent of fear of the so-called "alimony drone," id. at 574, that is,
the stereotype of an ex-wife "living in indolent luxury on the proceeds of her ex-
husband's labor." CLARK, supra note 20, § 16.4, at 650.
50. Krauskopf, supra note 30, at 581.
51. See CLARK, supra note 20, § 16.4, at 650.
52. Davila v. Davila, 876 P.2d 1089, 1094 (Alaska 1994).
53. Richmond v. Richmond, 779 P.2d 1211, 1215 n.6 (Alaska 1989).
54. Id-
55. Id.
56. Id. at n.3.
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different findings, and are consequently distinct forms of temporary
support, they are not mutually exclusive; in some instances, when
supported by the record, both may be appropriate."57  The
evidence, of course, must establish that both forms of awards would
be just and necessary; while "a trial court need not make findings
regarding every [statutory] factor, [the court].has remanded awards
of alimony where there is an insufficient analysis of the needs of
the alimony recipient or the means of the paying party."5"
The court's treatment of reorientation alimony, like that of
rehabilitative alimony, rests on the dubious assumption that women
who can establish the requisite financial need that would entitle
them to an alimony award can become self-supporting in relatively
short periods of time. Indeed, alimony awards in Alaska usually
last, on average, for only one year. Moreover, the median monthly
award is estimated at $500, while nearly half of the women
receiving alimony lack other sources of income5 9 Thus, one sees
a perverse tension between the theoretical underpinnings of these
forms of short-term awards and their practical effects on women
after divorce. In other words:
[S]hort duration awards of only one year run counter to an
acknowledgement of the actual time required to train and find
gainful employment. Most vocational and professional programs
could not be completed in the length of time spousal mainte-
nance is provided for. Hardest hit by this contradiction are
homemakers who have little work experience outside the
home. 0
In sum, the Alaska Supreme Court's current alimony regime
suffers from two important defects. First, the court's views do not
account for the reality that most women, particularly homemaker
wives in long-term marriages, are stripped of their financial security
at divorce. Second, the court's approach rests on the faulty
assumption that women have achieved a general level of economic
parity with men and can be quickly mainstreamed into the
57. Id. at 1094. For an example, see Money v. Money, 852 P.2d 1158, 1164
(Alaska 1993) ("By awarding [the wife] alimony to aid her in preparing for the job
market and to help her organize her portion of the marital estate assets, the
superior court effectively awarded [her] both rehabilitative and reorientation
alimony.").
58. Gallant v. Gallant, 882 P.2d 1252, 1255 (Alaska 1994) (citing Renfro v.
Renfro, 848 P.2d 830, 834 (Alaska 1993), and Jones v. Jones, 835 P.2d 1173, 1179
(Alaska 1992)).
59. Baker, supra note 7, at 17-18.
60. Id. at 17.
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competitive labor market. As a result, Alaska alimony rules,
though couched in gender-neutral terms, have in judicial application
exacerbated gender-aligned inequities.
II. THE RECENT TREND AND ASSOCIATED PROBLEMS
A. The Frequency of Remanding for Specific Findings
An examination of recent Alaska Supreme Court case law
involving alimony awards reveals a distinct trend: the court
consistently remands spousal support awards to the trial court for
further specific findings as to the amount and duration of such
payments. Jones v. Jones6 offers perhaps the most striking
example of this trend and reveals much of what is wrong with the
court's current approach to reviewing alimony awards. Jones
involved a thirty-eight year marriage that produced four children.
The wife, Virginia, never completed the ninth grade, was never
employed during the marriage, and was fifty-seven years old at the
time of trial.62 Her former husband, Billie, had been employed at
several oil companies during the marriage. He was earning
$145,000 per year at the time of separation and had an annual
salary of $115,000 at the time of trial.' Expert medical testimony
presented at trial established that Virginia was plagued by "chronic
lower back pain, chronic leg pain due to a tumor, situational
depression, and chronic anxiety," all of which would restrict
Virginia's ability to work.' The trial judge, Judge John Reese,
concluded that due to Virginia's "age and debilitated status, it [was]
not reasonable to expect her to become economically emp-
loyed." 6  He further made the specific factual finding that
Virginia's "reasonable needs are somewhat in excess of $2500.00
per month ' 66 and, "in light of Billie's lucrative and secure ca-
reer,167 ordered Billie to pay alimony in the amount of $2,500 per
month until he retired at the age of sixty-five.' Judge Reese
explained that the award would "maintain Mrs. Jones in an
61. 835 P.2d 1173 (Alaska 1992).
62. Id. at 1174.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 1175.
67. Id.
68. Id.
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appropriate station in life although somewhat less than the standard
of living to which she was accustomed."69 In consideration of her
remaining needs, he pronounced a property settlement that
awarded Virginia seventy percent of the marital assets.70
The Alaska Supreme Court did not dispute the medical
conclusions regarding Virginia's physical and mental incapacitation.
Indeed, the court found that "the record contains substantial
evidence in support of the [trial] court's finding that Virginia is not
employable."'" Despite this conclusion, the court held that the
record revealed an insufficient inquiry into Virginia's current
"circumstances and necessities."' Finding itself unable to evalu-
ate whether Judge Reese's award of $2,500 per month satisfied the
"just and necessary" statutory standard, the court vacated the
alimony award and remanded the spousal support determination
for "specific findings concerning [Virginia's] financial needs and
expenses."7
Another recent case, Davila v. Davila,74 involved a similar
scenario. Rita and Robert Davila divorced in 1992 after a marriage
of twenty-five years, during which time Rita took care of most of
the domestic and child-rearing responsibilities.75 Robert spent
nineteen years in the military and thereafter obtained a position
with the Federal Aviation Administration. Rita was employed as
a full-time civil servant after 1980.76 At the time of trial, Robert
was forty-six years old and received total monthly earnings of
$4,109; Rita was forty-three years old and took home $1,516 in net
monthly pay.' The trial court awarded Rita reorientation
alimony for four years, in payments of $800 per month for the first
two years and $700 per month for the remaining two years.78 The
trial court explained that its purpose in fashioning the award was
"'to aid [Rita] to adjust to new financial circumstances and a new
life style.' ' '79
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id at 1179.
72. Id. (quoting Merrill v. Merrill, 368 P.2d 546, 547 n.4 (Alaska 1962)).
73. Id. at 1179.
74. 876 P.2d 1089 (Alaska 1994).
75. Id. at 1091.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 1095.
78. Id. at 1093.
79. Id. (citation omitted in original) (alteration in original).
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The Alaska Supreme Court remanded the alimony determina-
tion, holding that the trial court had failed to "specifically address
Rita's needs" by "not specify[ing] the nature of the financial
circumstances Rita would face or the scope of the adjustment she
would be required to make."s Apparently hostile to any resolu-
tion that would create continuing obligations between the parties,
the court found it particularly objectionable that the trial court had
failed to justify adequately why it selected a monthly payment
scheme that would last four years." The court also believed that
the trial court had not specifically addressed "the impact that the
payments could be expected to have on [Robert's] own financial
circumstances."'
The supreme court's handling of Davila must be analyzed in
the context of the scope and detail of the trial court's findings. In
Davila, as in Jones, the lower court's decision was guided precisely
by the factors enumerated in section 25.24.160(a)(2) and was
informed by the broader commanding principles explicitly embed-
ded in the statute. The trial court examined such factors as the
length of the marriage," the age of the parties," the station in
life of the parties during the marriage and their custodial responsi-
bilities for their children,' the specific earning capacity of each
party," the parties' educational backgrounds," the parties'
employment skills and job experiences' and the nature of the
80. Id. at 1095.
81. Id.
82. Id
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. In this regard, the supreme court noted that "Rita delayed her career plans
during the marriage in the interests of raising her children and subordinated her
career to Robert's." Id. at 1095.
86. This figure was determined by using Rita's yearly salary and Robert's
annual salary and retirement and disability benefits. Id.
87. The court noted that during the marriage "Robert received a number of
higher educational degrees while Rita received an associate's degree." Id. On this
point, the court further observed that Rita "could not advance in her current job
without higher education," and that at the time of trial "Rita was studying for a
bachelor's degree, which she expected to complete in five years at the current rate
of taking two classes per semester while working full time," id., which would
appear to offer an explanation for the court's selection of the four-year payment
duration.
88. The court declared that "Rita left the marriage with vastly inferior job
skills and earning power than Robert." Id.
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marital property division.89 Thus the trial court seems to have
made specific findings concerning both the needs of the claimant
and the obligor's ability to pay. Its order was therefore clearly
geared toward addressing the "economic effect of divorce" as
mandated by statute,' and its decision reflected an award that it
believed would be just and necessary under the circumstances.
Given such pertinent factual findings, combined with stated
justifications for the resulting conclusions of law, one would assume
that the supreme court could have undertaken informed and
meaningful appellate review of the correctness of the award instead
of remanding the case for further findings. Instead, the court,
possibly motivated by its aversion to alimony awards, remanded the
case for even more factual findings.
Jones and Davila are by no means aberrations. Although their
facts are particularly compelling, they represent the norm as to how
the court has come to review alimony awards. Other examples of
the court's tendency to place onerous burdens on claimants to
provide further factual detail can be seen in cases such as Gallant
v. Gallant,9 Hanlon v. Hanlon,92 Dixon v. Dixon,93 Miller v.
Miller,94 and Messina v. Messina,' all of which were remanded
for more factual findings.9
6
B. Problems with the Trend
1. Remand is often unnecessary, impractical and yields
inequitable results. The Jones decision illustrates why remand in
many of these cases is unwarranted and suggests that there is more
89. The trial court had noted that the parties did "'not have sufficient liquid
assets, nor property which could be converted to liquid assets to properly allocate
an equitable division of property between [them]."' Id (citations omitted in
original).
90. See ALASKA STAT. § 25.24.160(a)(2) (1991).
91. 882 P.2d 1252 (Alaska 1994).
92. 871 P.2d 229 (Alaska 1994).
93. 747 P.2d 1169 (Alaska 1987).
94. 739 P.2d 163 (Alaska 1987).
95. 583 P.2d 804 (Alaska 1978).
96. One recent case, Ulsher v. Ulsher, 867 P.2d 819 (Alaska 1994), seems to
have departed from this trend by affirming a five-year rehabilitative alimony award
to a claimant pursuing a civil engineering degree. However, at least one justice
recognized this case as aberrant. Justice Matthews dissented due to what he
considered to be an absence of the type of specific findings the court has
customarily come to require in such cases. Id at 823-24 (Matthews, J., dissenting).
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to the remand trend than the court simply seeking to circumscribe
the trial court's vast discretion. The record in Jones discloses that
the trial court made extensive findings as to the abilities and needs
of both parties. 7 Moreover, these findings were firmly grounded
in the relevant statutory criteria that are designed to guide a trial
judge's discretion in this area.' For instance, Judge Reese made
explicit reference to the following factors: the long marital
duration; the station in life of the parties during the marriage; the
age and health of both parties; the parties' earning capacity; the
parties' educational backgrounds, employment skills, work
experiences, length of absence from the job market, and custodial
responsibilities of the parties during the marriage; the financial
conditions of the parties; and the division of marital property.99
The trial court therefore addressed all of the relevant factors that
must be considered under Alaska law, carefully weighing those
factors in order to fashion a "just and necessary" alimony award
that would "fairly allocate the economic effect of divorce," as the
controlling statute mandates.'a
Given the breadth and detail of the trial court's findings, the
supreme court's conclusion that "the record reveals little of
Virginia's current 'circumstances and needs"'10' 1 is puzzling.
Perhaps the court suspiciously viewed the award as too sizeable and
too prolonged with the potential of conferring an indefinite windfall
on Virginia. However, though the court stopped short of holding
that the trial court abused its discretion, the court's remand for
more specific findings as to Virginia's financial needs seems to
compel the conclusion that the court regarded the award as so
favorable to Virginia as to be unjust or unnecessary. The decision
therefore reveals that the Alaska Supreme Court considers the
satisfaction of financial need the paramount objective of the
alimony statute and the dispositive issue in its evaluation of
maintenance awards.
As a general proposition, giving such controlling weight to
financial need is anchored in dubious statutory construction,
especially given the "laundry-list" of factors enumerated in the
statute that must aggregate to produce an award that meets the
97. See supra text accompanying notes 62-70.
98. See ALASKA STAT. § 25.24.160(a)(2)(A)-(G) (1991).
99. See Jones v. Jones, 835 P.2d 1173, 1174-75 (Alaska 1992).
100. ALASKA STAT. § 25.24.160(a)(2) (1991).
101. Jones, 835 P.2d at 1179.
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overarching statutory "just and necessary" standard."°  At the
same time, the court neither provides functional guidance as to how
the "specific financial needs" inquiry should be conducted nor
offers any principled justification for its narrow interpretation of
what might constitute a just and necessary award.
As to the particular facts in Jones, the amount of support
awarded by the trial judge was by no means an arbitrary exercise
of discretion. Virginia had submitted a financial declaration of
total monthly expenses of roughly $4,000, which included such
items as telephone, auto, dental, food, household and incidental
expenses. 3 The supreme court concluded that Virginia's figure
"appear[ed] to overstate her actual needs."'' The trial judge
apparently agreed, and awarded Virginia $1,500 less than she
requested. One must assume that the trial judge was in the best
position to assess the evidence presented at trial to arrive at an
award he considered "just and necessary." In fact, in setting the
monthly amount at $2,500 per month, the trial court found that
Virginia's "'reasonable needs are somewhat in excess of $2,500.00
per month,""'  and that such an amount would maintain her in
a station in life "'somewhat less than the standard of living to which
she was accustomed."''  In addition, since the trial court's order
terminated the support payments upon Billie's retirement, the
maximum duration of his obligation to Virginia would have been
eight years. While this time period is concededly far longer than
the court generally sanctions, it is nonetheless one that, strictly
speaking, cannot be labelled "permanent." In short, the trial
court's factual findings and conclusions of law with regard to its
102. See ALASKA STAT. § 25.24.160(a)(2) (1991).
103. Id. at 1179 n.8.
104. Id. For a different analysis, compare Hilliker v. Hilliker, 755 P.2d 1111
(Alaska 1988). Hilliker involved a 32-year marriage in which the husband earned
$103,500 per year and the wife earned $18,800 per year. Id. at 1112. While the
Alaska Supreme Court held that an award of permanent alimony was unwarranted
in view of the availability of property that could be divided to provide support, see
id. at 1113, 1114, it also held that the trial court had properly assessed the wife's
needs in allowing her $2,360 per year for gifts, donations, pet care and vacations,
in addition to a $1,500 annual amount for clothing and $1,200 for automobile
replacement. Id. at 1113. The court expressly found that "[e]ach of these items
seems reasonably includable in an annual budget and the amount for each is
supported by the evidence." Id.
105. Jones, 835 P.2d at 1179 (citation omitted in original) (emphasis added).
106. Id. at 1175 (citation omitted in original) (emphasis added).
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decision to award alimony, as well as the award's amount and
duration, were amply supported in the record. The trial court can
therefore be said to have complied with its duty under Alaska Rule
of Civil Procedure 52(a) "'to give the appellate court a clear
understanding of the basis of the trial court's decision, and to
enable [the appellate court] to determine the grounds on which the
trial court reached its decision."' w
The supreme court's treatment of the alimony issue in Jones
prompted a dissent from Justice Rabinowitz. Stressing the
importance of the "compelling facts""' that supported the deci-
sion below, Justice Rabinowitz argued that the majority had
"overlook[ed] relevant findings by the superior court as well as
explicit statutory criteria which must be considered by the superior
court in making an alimony determination."'" Specifically,
Justice Rabinowitz asserted that the supreme court erred by
"focus[ing] exclusively upon Virginia Jones' specific financial needs
to the exclusion of all other relevant factors mandated for consider-
ation by [section] 25.24.160(a)(2)," ''1 considerations which the
trial court had properly weighed and set out in its decision.
Perhaps expressing frustration with his colleagues' demonstrable
aversion to alimony, and fearing the potentially inequitable results
of remanding support decisions under such circumstances, Justice
Rabinowitz remarked that "the legislature did not intend to limit
alimony to subsistence levels for recipient spouses."'
It is certainly unobjectionable that the law of alimony should
encourage former spouses to finalize their personal and financial
entanglements and move on with their respective lives. Yet in its
zeal to effectuate such a "clean break" by resisting longer-term
alimony commitments, the supreme court grossly undervalues the
investments of women like Virginia Jones in such marriages and
underestimates the financial realities which they face at divorce.
Equally troubling is that Jones presents the paradigm factual
predicate under which a presumptive entitlement to alimony should
arise. Yet, in a footnote to its opinion, the Jones court found that
107. Merrill v. Merrill, 368 P.2d 546, 548 (Alaska 1962) (quoting Irish v. United
States, 225 F.2d 3, 8 (9th Cir. 1955) and citing United States v. Horsfall, 270 F.2d
107 (10th Cir. 1959)).
108. Jones, 835 P.2d at 1181 (Rabinowitz, J., dissenting).
109. Id. at 1180 (Rabinowitz, J., dissenting).
110. Id. at 1181 (Rabinowitz, J., dissenting).
111. Id. at 1181 n.4 (Rabinowitz, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
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Virginia failed to meet her burden of "reasonably verify[ing] ...
her claimed monthly financial needs."' It seems, then, that the
record must be replete with sales receipts or canceled checks before
the court will uphold what it perceives to be a "sizeable" award,
even in cases where the trial court has made specific findings
concerning the resources, abilities and needs of the parties and has
articulated the basis for its conclusions within the framework of the
governing statutory criteria. Perhaps the court might even expect
trial judges to include with their findings of fact and conclusions of
law a detailed, anticipated monthly budget for each alimony
claimant that could then be reviewed on appeal. One suspects that
the court has backed itself into a corner with its alimony precedent
and has fallen prey to the law of unintended consequences. For
instance, the supreme court's "reasonable verification" require-
ment-innocuous on its face and seemingly satisfied in Jones-has
become in operation an unreasonable burden on both alimony
claimants and the trial judges who first hear their cases.
Finally, if the court continues to hold that the type of
evidence and fact-finding in Jones is inadequate, one can expect
unnecessary delays for judges with burgeoning dockets, less
efficient utilization of judicial resources, greater burdens on counsel
to prepare the requisite financial declarations, and increased costs
for the litigants-all of which carry a disproportionate economic
impact on the financially dependent spouse, most often the former
wife.
2. The scheme produces uncertainty and negatively influences
settlement. Two characteristics of divorce cases have conspired to
make alimony predictions particularly difficult to make. First,
divorce cases are inevitably fact specific. To aid the judge in
sorting through the pertinent facts to allocate alimony, the
controlling statute lists seven factors, without making any single
factor dispositive"' Second, the court continues to remand
alimony awards for more specific findings regarding the financial
needs of the claimant, without offering trial courts guidance in the
form of concrete examples or definitional principles about how
such determinations should be made. Such uncertainty exerts a
negative influence on the settlement discussions that are often
critical in such cases, particularly to the detriment of divorcing
112. Id. at 1179 n.8.
113. See ALASKA STAT. §§ 25.24.160(a)(2)(A)-(G) (1991).
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wives. As one commentator has observed, "[t]he absence of clear-
cut legal standards... affects the negotiation process in ways that
disadyantage the economically weaker party, generally the woman,
in a divorce., 114  Even experienced family law practitioners in
Alaska would be hard-pressed to predict comfortably for clients
whether an alimony claim will succeed in the first instance, let
alone to divine the amount of anticipated alimony recovery. 5
III. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR AN IMPROVED MODEL OF
ALIMONY
n6
A. A New Theoretical Approach: Examining the Relationship
Between "Need" and "Loss"
A growing body of family law literature, critical of the norms
traditionally employed to resolve divorce cases, has urged a
movement toward grounding alimony awards in the principles of
compensation for loss rather than satisfaction of need. 7 The
traditional marriage arrangement, and the gendered division of
labor it reflects, tends to impair the economic or market prospects
of the wife while simultaneously improving those of the husband.
The woman who assumes the role of homemaker or primary
114. Singer, supra note 5, at 1119; see also WEITZMAN, supra note 4, at 234-35;
Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law:
The Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950 (1979).
115. See generally ELLMAN ET AL., supra note 3, at 688-692 and sources cited
therein.
116. Procedural improvements are currently being considered in Alaska.
Recently, Chief Justice Moore of the Alaska Supreme Court established the
Family Rules Committee. This body considers changes to the rules of civil and
appellate procedure that might effectively address some of the discrete problems
that have arisen in the family law context. Telephone Interview with Christine E.
Johnson, Court Rules Attorney, Alaska Court System (Mar. 28, 1995). Some of
the proposed changes could mitigate the problems of judicial delay and excess
costs to litigants that plague the resolution of divorce cases. However, these
procedural changes have very limited potential to redress the more fundamental
inequities of the present alimony scheme. To affect a change in the court's
perceived aversion to alimony awards, a new legal and philosophical framework
is required.
117. See, e.g., Katharine K. Baker, Contracting for Security: Paying Married
Women What They've Earned, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1193 (1988); Margaret F.
Brining & June Carbone, The Reliance Interest in Marriage and Divorce, 62 TUL.
L. RaV. 855 (1988); Ellman, supra note 48; Rutherford, supra note 21; Singer,
supra note 5.
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caretaker of marital children often withdraws from the labor
market for extended periods of time. As a result, she incurs
financial disadvantages in a variety of forms, including loss of
educational opportunities, undeveloped job skills, foregone career
advancement, and loss of direct, employment-related benefits such
as wages and pension and insurance plans. Such disadvantages are
compensated through the husband's income-earning activities
during marriage. However, at the dissolution of the marriage the
disadvantages incurred impose on the homemaker spouse a vastly
reduced earning capacity, severely restricting her ability to support
herself at a level approaching the marital standard of living. Put
differently, the sacrifices of a homemaker spouse in a long-term
marriage, often made in the interests of the marriage as a joint
economic partnership, help to free her husband to pursue his
economic interests. The fruits of the husband's activities form his
monetary contribution to the marital unit, a contribution in which
the homemaker spouse fully expects to share. With the marriage
breakdown, however, the wife's non-monetary investments leave
her to bear a disproportionate share of the resulting losses, while
the husband's investment in his market skills and opportunities
confers on him a substantially increased earning capacity.
Herein should lie the central focus of the law of alimony. At
divorce, disparate economic ramifications befall each party as a
result of the decisions they made in conducting their joint marital
endeavor. Where the female spouse incurs substantial economic
disadvantages because of the corresponding economic advantage
she has conferred on her husband, the law has both a theoretical
and practical justification for imposing an obligation on the
husband to compensate his former spouse for such loss. The
husband should be required to make alimony payments not simply
because his former wife has some ill-defined sense of need, but
because her conduct during the marriage has helped to insulate him
from, and expose her to, the adverse economic consequences that
generally accompany divorce. In short, "[t]he need upon which the
right to maintenance is based therefore follows from the loss
incurred by the maintained spouse in contributing to the marriage
partnership.
' 'M8
118. LAW REFORM COMM'N OF CANADA, MAINTENANCE ON DIVORCE 24
(Working Paper 12,1975), cited with approval in Moge v. Moge, 99 D.L.R.4th 456,
486-487 (Can. 1992).
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In consistently remanding cases for a more detailed justifica-
tion of how the alimony award comports with the claimant's
specific financial needs, the Alaska Supreme Court seems to have
lost sight of the fact that such need is necessarily informed and
defined by what has been lost by the claimant during marriage.
Moreover, a close examination of the court's opinions in this area
suggests that its needs-based standard is intended to limit, or at
least has the effect of limiting, alimony recipients to awards that
account only for the "bare essentials." The law of alimony should
seek instead to impose an equitable sharing of the economic
consequences of divorce that accurately reflects the nature of the
investments made by each spouse as part of their joint undertaking.
This goal is more effectively served by focusing a court's inquiry on
the extent of the loss incurred by the alimony claimant during
marriage, particularly in terms of reduced earning capacity.
Moreover, such a conceptual shift would be consistent with the
relevant statutory factors and would more realistically account for
the fact that a formerly dependent wife is often in need at divorce
precisely because the failure of the marriage imposes disproportion-
ate financial losses on her.
Empirical evidence confirms the effects that choosing to
dedicate oneself to domestic responsibilities has on that spouse's
future earning potential. One recent study, for example, found that
the earning capacity of the stay-at-home wife erodes by 1.5% for
each year that she has withdrawn from the labor force."9 Based
on this and similar data, the Florida Supreme Court Gender Bias
Study Commission recently concluded:
[W]omen who forego a career outside the home suffer a
permanent economic loss justifying compensation in the form of
alimony upon dissolution. The Commission thus concludes that
alimony cannot be discarded in favor of property distribution.
When property is used as the sole method of distributing marital
assets, women suffer a disproportionate impact upon their future,
compared to men. This occurs because few marital assets are in
the form of divisible property and because there is an enormous
gap in earning potential between men and women at every stage
of their lives, regardless of their education .... Thus alimony
should be considered as general compensation for the wife s lost
119. Mark A. Sessums, What Are Wives' Contributions Worth Upon Divorce:
Towards Fully Incorporating Partnership Into Equitable Distribution, 41 FLA. L.
REV. 987, 1029 n.27 (1989).
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opportunities rather than a claim for support based upon need."
These economic dynamics, and their ramifications for divorce
litigants, have recently been recognized in Moge v. Moge, an
important decision of the Canadian Supreme Court.' In Moge,
the parties had been married for more than twenty years, and the
husband had been paying support for sixteen years following their
separation. During the marriage, the wife, who had a grade seven
education level, served as primary caretaker for the couple's three
children, maintained the family home and supplemented the family
income by working nights as an office cleaner. " The trial court
granted the husband's application to terminate support, concluding
that the wife had been given sufficient time to become financially
self-sufficient."z The court of appeals reinstated spousal support
for an indefinite period2 and the Supreme Court of Canada
affirmed.'25
The court initially took notice of the phenomenon that the
gender-specific division of labor characteristic of traditional
marriages leaves recently divorced women burdened with substan-
tial financial hardship and market disability." Yet rather than
stopping there and concluding that the wife was entitled to support
based on some elastic or subjective concept of her ostensible
"need," the court took the next step and identified the source of
her post-divorce need: the sacrifices she made in contributing her
full-time domestic services for the sake of the joint marital
endeavor. The court observed that the critical element in compen-
satory analysis is not simply that the wife has incurred demonstra-
ble economic loss, but that this very process simultaneously can
confer significant economic advantages on the husband. 27 While
these twin effects remain effectively concealed as the marriage
remains intact, they are fully realized at divorce. In other words,
as the wife's earning capacity atrophies with time spent outside the
120. FLORIDA STuDY, supra note 17, at 58 (emphasis added).
121. 99 D.L.R.4th 456 (Can. 1992). For an in-depth discussion of this case and
the philosophical approach it endorses by the justice who authored the Moge
opinion, see Claire L'Heureux-Dube, Economic Consequences of Divorce: A View
From Canada, 31 Hous. L. REv. 451 (1994).
122. Moge, 99 D.L.R.4th at 461.
123. Id. at 463.
124. Id. at 462.
125. Id. at 499.
126. Il at 488.
127. Id.
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labor force, her husband's capacity grows as he is freed from the
domestic responsibilities he otherwise might share with his
homemaker spouse. Upon dissolution, however, he will experience
little difficulty in adapting to a condition of economic self-sufficien-
cy, while his dependent spouse faces a radically different set of
circumstances. Thus, when the marriage dissolves, "[t]he sacrifices
[the wife] has made at home catch up with her and the balance
shifts in favour of the husband who has remained in the work force
and focused his attention outside the home. In effect, she is left
with a diminished earning capacity and may have conferred upon
her husband an embellished one."'" It is precisely this interplay
that justifies imposing a legal obligation of post-dissolution support
on the husband.
Perhaps the central factor in this analysis is the implicit
recognition that the non-monetary contributions of the homemaker
or primary caretaker spouse should properly be regarded as her
economic contribution to the marital unit since they necessarily free
her husband to maximize his economic aspirations and worth in the
marketplace.'29 While the income-producing spouse's monetary
investments and increased earning capacity will be highly valued in
the marketplace after divorce (thereby ensuring him a high degree
of sustained economic security), the domestic services rendered by
his wife will not be so valued. What might be construed as the
opportunity cost of foregoing her own educational or career
investments leaves her to face disproportionate economic hardship.
Under such circumstances, it is both logical and necessary for
divorce law to attempt to redress such inequities.
In light of these considerations, the Moge court concluded:
In cases where relatively few advantages have been conferred or
disadvantages incurred, transitional support allowing for full and
unimpaired reintegration back into the labour force might be all
that is required to afford sufficient compensation. However, in
many cases a former spouse will continue to suffer the economic
disadvantages of the marriage and its dissolution while the other
spouse reaps its economic advantages. In such cases, compensa-
128. Id.
129. While the Alaska Supreme Court might, at present, hesitate to embrace
this proposition fully, it has indicated some willingness to move in this direction.
For instance, in evaluating a trial court rehabilitative alimony award, the court
observed that the wife's "role in the marriage was primarily domestic, but this was
apparently a role decided on by the parties jointly, and should be recognized as
a valuable contribution to the marital enterprise." Bussell v. Bussell, 623 P.2d
1221, 1223 (Alaska 1981).
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tory spousal support would require long-term support or an
alternative settlement which provides an equivalent degree of
assistance.... Yo
Therefore in Moge the Canadian Supreme Court affirmatively
endorsed a compensatory approach to the payment of alimony.
The court interpreted Canada's Divorce Act of 1970 as requiring
the "fair and equitable distribution of resources to alleviate the
economic consequences of marriage or marriage breakdown for
both spouses, regardless of gender."'' The court concluded that
effectuating such an equitable distribution would necessitate the
"development of parameters with which to assess the respective
advantages and disadvantages of the spouses as a result of their
roles in the marriage, as the starting point in determining the
degree of support to be awarded."'32
Finally, the Moge decision is instructive in that it emphasizes
the degree to which custodial responsibility of the children of the
marriage must enter into any "disadvantages incurred-advantages
conferred" calculus. It is generally the case that custody is awarded
to the wife, who, as noted above, also assumes disproportionate
financial liabilities at divorce. An alimony doctrine premised on
the idea that the parties should equitably share the economic
consequences of their marital failure would seem to require that
this reality be given the law's attention in the fashioning of support
awards. One might reasonably argue that such concerns are the
proper domain of child support payments. Yet it is plain that the
custodial parent incurs financial disabilities that transcend, and add
to, the direct costs of guaranteeing the welfare, of her children and
that severely restrict her own range of economic choices. As the
court therefore properly noted:
The diminished earning capacity with which an ex-wife enters the
labour force after years of reduced or non-participation will be
even more difficult to overcome when economic choice is
reduced, unlike that of her ex-husband, due to the necessity of
remaining within proximity to schools, not working late,
remaining at home when the child is ill, etc. The other spouse
encounters none of these impediments.133
In such circumstances, the wife's continuing child care responsibili-
ties can only accentuate the need for the law of alimony to
130. Moge, 99 D.L.R.4th at 487-88 (emphasis added).
131. Id. at 479.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 489-90.
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compensate the dependent spouse for losses incurred during
marriage.
Professor Ira Ellman has been one of the strongest proponents
of reconceiving alimony as compensatory spousal support."
Ellman has developed a comprehensive theory of alimony,
complete with guiding principles and operative rules, which would
be invaluable to any efforts by the Alaska Supreme Court to
reconceptualize or rearticulate its philosophical and practical
approach to alimony.135 The utility of Ellman's approach lies
both in providing a defensible legal theory upon which alimony can
be based and in identifying those sets of facts that would yield
compensable losses for the purposes of alimony. Reduced to its
core, Ellman's theory of alimony is "designed to encourage socially
beneficial sharing behavior in marriage by requiring compensation
for lost earning capacity arising from that behavior."016
Ellman begins his analysis by highlighting the magnitude of the
investment risks borne by women in the traditional marriage. In
such a relationship, the wife makes substantial "up-front" invest-
ments, most often in the form of providing domestic services and
bearing and raising children, skills and services that are effectively
valueless in the commercial world. Indeed, these investments "give
her no prospects for a return in the open market commensurate
with her investment."'37 Yet these investments have undeniable
present value to and confer immediate, continuing benefit on her
husband. The husband, in turn, can invest in his earning capacity
134. See generally Ellman, supra note 48. Most recently, Professor Ellman has
served as the Reporter for the forthcoming AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE,
PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMEN-
DATIONS, Council Draft No. 1 (Nov. 1993). Much of Ellman's theory forms the
core of the rules and principles laid out in Chapter 5, entitled "Compensatory
Spousal Payments." The ALI principles are, at the time of this writing, only in
draft form, and have yet to receive final Council ratification.
135. While some of Ellman's language recalls a contractual-type obligation with
the concomitant remedy of expected benefit, Part I of his article describes in detail
the failure of the contract analogy in the alimony context, primarily because
"grounding alimony on an agreement for the conduct of the marriage... [would]
conceptualize it as an award of damages to one spouse for the other spouse's
breach," a principle inconsistent with the contemporary no-fault divorce regime.
Ellman, supra note 48, at 16.
136. Id. at 12. For a thoughtful discussion of such sharing behavior in the
context of property division analysis, see Susan W. Prager, Sharing Principles and
the Future of Marital Property Law, 25 UCLA L. REV. 1, 7-13 (1977).
137. Ellman, supra note 48, at 42.
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and contribute financial support to the marriage as such earning
capacity grows over the years. Moreover, these investments are
integral to an economically successful marriage. The traditional
wife, then, "makes her marital investment early in the expectation
of a deferred return: sharing in the fruits of her husband's eventual
market success."' 38 If the marriage breaks down in later years,
dissolution occurs precisely when the wife should be realizing her
gains coincident with the maximization of her husband's earning
potential. Thus, in reality it is the marriage risks that she realizes
"when the same accommodations to marital roles that were rational
within the marriage now leave her disproportionately burden-
ed." '139 The current alimony regime, by not recognizing the wife's
past contributions as economically valuable partnership resources,
imposes on her the full brunt of what, in hindsight, the law proves
to have been an improvident long-term investment. But this is not
so for the ex-husband, whose enhanced earning capacity continues
to demand a high premium in the marketplace after divorce. This
result is clearly perverse: the law of alimony should be protecting
the dependent spouse from this very scenario, rather than guaran-
teeing that it will occur.' °
Such dynamics are not unique to the so-called "traditional"
marriage. In a social context where husbands considerably out-earn
their working wives, 4 rational economic planning would seem to
dictate that the spouse with the lower earning power invest in the
marriage rather than in her earning capacity in the market-an
economic sacrifice that is designed to serve the integrated interests
of the marriage partnership.' This means, of course, that the
wife will generally assume the traditional role of home-
maker/primary caretaker, and with it, both a status of economic
dependency and a heightened risk if what was expected to be an
138. Id.
139. Id. at 49.
140. Ellman further highlights that non-economic factors such as "the gender
differences in the impact of age on marriageability" exacerbate women's post-
divorce predicament. Id at 44. He notes that in addition to making "substantial
investments early in expectation of a deferred return," the traditional wife
increasingly depletes her "marriageability" the longer she is married. Id.
141. See id at n.137 (citing BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF
COMMERCE, CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS, SPECIAL STUDIES SERIES P-23,
No. 133, EARNINGS IN 1981 OF MARRIED COUPLES FAMILIES, BY SELECTED
CHARACTERISTICS OF HUSBANDS AND WIVES 29 (1984)).
142. Id. at 46.
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enduring, sharing enterprise collapses. In light of these realities,
Ellman makes the following observations:
In fact, many if not most marriages in which the wife is em-
ployed are still traditional in orientation; she continues to carry
a disproportionate share of the domestic responsibilities,
burdening her career advancement, and it is her job which yields
when there is a conflict between spousal jobs. Where the
husband's work is more lucrative than the wife's, this arrange-
ment is economically rational. Nevertheless, the wife's position
is then similar to that of the classic homemaker-wife. She has
not abandoned a market career, but she has sacrificed some
career prospects to invest instead in her marriage. If the marital
unit dissolves, she no longer shares in her husband's enhanced
income and, absent some contractual or statutory remedy, the
husband leaves the marriage with the benefit of her investment
in his earning capacity. 43
Having identified the problem of asymmetrical allocation of
investment risk during marriage, and its inevitable corollary of
disproportionate financial consequences following divorce, Ellman
offers a reconceptualized version of alimony as the solution.
Marital behavior, in the sense of how spouses decide to allocate
their respective roles and responsibilities, can be said to be
economically rational while the parties maintain their commitment
to sharing. However, when that commitment dissolves, it imposes
disproportionate financial disabilities on the dependent spouse.
Plus, since the "legal environment ... does not reallocate lost
earning capacity on divorce,"'" the present alimony regime
effectively penalizes the homemaker-spouse. Against this back-
drop, a new function of alimony emerges: "to reallocate the
postdivorce financial consequences of marriage in order to prevent
distorting incentives."'45 As Ellman states, "[a] system of alimony
that compensates the wife who has disproportionate postmarriage
losses arising from her marital investment protects marital decision-
making from the potentially destructive pressures of a market that
does not value marital investment as much as it values career
enhancement.' 146
The critical feature here is not only the protection from
distorting market incentives the theory seeks to afford the disad-
vantaged spouse, but also the close nexus the theory demands
143. 1& at 46-47.
144. IdM at 50.
145. Id
146. Id. at 51.
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between cause and effect-compensable losses must have their
origin in economically rational marital investment. Consequently,
Ellman's theory is grounded in a defensible, and compelling, modus
operandi: "equalizing losses arising from sharing behavior in the
failed marriage, and not simply equalizing postdivorce income
without regard for how the inequality came about."'47
Having defined the purpose of alimony as compensating
financial losses that originate in economically rational marital
investment during marriage, Ellman offers principles and rules with
which to identify and value the appropriate compensable losses.
Ellman's approach compares "the claimant's economic situation at
the end of the marriage with the situation she would have been in
if she had not married," a comparison that "reveals that lost
earning capacity is the only continuing financial loss."'" There-
fore, under Ellman's first principle, a showing of lost earning
capacity resulting from marital investment is a condition precedent
to establishing a presumptive entitlement to an alimony award.49
Because alimony under this scheme compensates only those
financial losses that can be traced to how the spouses decided to
allocate their joint marital duties, the law is justified in rendering
the spouse who benefitted therefrom liable to the spouse who
suffered. Thus, the remedy not only protects the wife's marital
investment, but mitigates the distorting financial pressures that
would discourage her from making it. ° As to the precise nature
of this remedy, Ellman identifies it as
an alimony award based upon the value of the alternative
investment [the wife] might have made in her earning capacity.
We must thus compare the wife's actual earning capacity when
the marriage ends with the earning capacity she would have
achieved if she had remained single. The difference equals our
general measure of the alimony claim against her husband.'
147. Id. at 52.
148. Id. at 53.
149. See id.
150. From this standpoint, Ellman's approach is attractive if one believes that
alimony rules should not discourage interdependency. Politically, at the risk of
over-generalization, the approach might find support both from liberal forces
inclined to welcome the legal recognition of a traditional wife's marital investment,
as well as from more conservative forces inclined to encourage and reward the
stay-at-home wife. From either perspective, "[ilf we really believe that homemak-
ing and caretaking are valuable contributions, we ought not to discourage them."
Rutheford, supra note 21, at 580.
151. Ellman, supra note 48, at 54 (footnotes omitted).
1995]
ALASKA LAW REVIEW
Ellman's second principle refines the type of marital conduct
that will yield a compensable loss. He specifies that "only
financially rational sharing behavior can qualify as ... marital
investment [for which recovery will be allowed]. Lost earning
capacity is thus not compensable if it arises from financially
irrational behavior... ."15 Because Ellman's third principle
independently addresses losses incurred from the care of marital
children," the limitation embodied in the second principle deals
principally with spousal role accommodations that are unrelated to
or do not arise from such care. To illustrate the application of the
second principle, Ellman offers the example of the "typical" two-
career couple who must decide how to best balance the potentially
conflicting demands of their careers. Often, the wife surrenders
distinct market opportunities so that her husband can further invest
in his earning capacity. The assumption is that the marriage will
continue as a shared financial enterprise the benefits of which will
inure to both parties. For instance, a schoolteacher-wife might give
up her position, and with it, prospects of becoming a high-level
administrator or principal in her present school system, in order to
join her professor-husband who has been offered the presidency of
a university in another city.154 From the perspective of the
marital unit as a whole, the wife's unilateral economic sacrifice can
be termed financially rational, because "[t]he expected increase in
the husband's income is greater than the expected value of the
wife's foregone opportunity, so this choice should yield their
marriage a net gain."155 Yet the calculus shifts dramatically at
divorce, when
[the husband] would receive the entire gain from his job change,
while [the wife] would incur the entire loss from hers, unless the
law makes some adjustment. A law designed to avoid penalizing
sharing behavior in marriage, to encourage spouses to think of
themselves communally rather than individually, would therefore
consider this history in fixing the spouses' postmarriage obliga-
tions. 56
Ellman's second principle, then, unlike the present alimony regime,
would recognize this sort of rational, and common, marital
investment, and would confer on the spouse who made it a
152. Id. at 58.
153. See infra text accompanying notes 171-73.
154. See Ellman, supra note 48, at 58-59.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 59.
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presumptive entitlement to be compensated through the remedy of
alimony.
Ellman next offers two rules to further define and facilitate the
application of his second principle. First, Rule 2.1 states that "[a]
loss of earning capacity incurred to accommodate a spouse's
lifestyle preferences, yielding a reduction in aggregate marital
income, is not compensable."'' 7 This rule, then, would generally
preclude claims that arise from "nonfinancial preferences in matters
such as geography, lifestyle and climate,"'5 8 reflecting the theory's
core notion to limit claimworthy alimony actions to financial losses
incurred for financially rational reasons. Moreover, the rule
reflects both a realistic assessment and the modest goals of what
Ellman believes his theory can and should address: while "the law
cannot evaluate every aspect of marital behavior in fixing the
divorcing parties' financial obligations,"' 59 rulemakers can "sensi-
bly isolate decisions that a couple rationally expects will enhance
their aggregate income, and ensure that in making such a decision
neither takes a risk of disproportionate loss if divorce then
occurs."'
160
The effects of Rule 2.1 are most vividly demonstrated by cases
in which homemakers in childless marriages assert an alimony
claim. The spouse who sacrifices the opportunity to invest in her
own market potential by assuming the role of homemaker and
primary caretaker undoubtedly suffers from a diminished earning
capacity, while the marriage as a whole benefits from a net income
gain. In contrast, in a childless marriage, the economic analysis
governing Ellman's preceding principles reveals that. this is "a
decision that predictably yields a reduction in aggregate marital
income: [t]hat is, to remain a homemaker in a childless marriage is
not ordinarily an economically rational decision, but instead reflects
a lifestyle preference."'' Under Rule 2.1, therefore, there would
be a rebuttable presumption against compensating the homemaker
in a childless marriage for her lost earning capacity. The rule,
however, does not create a "blanket exclusion"'62 against such
claimants. Rather, it leaves room for recovery in those presumably
157. Id. at 60 (capitalization altered).
158. Id. at 61.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 62.
161. Id. at 63.
162. Id. at 64.
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rare cases in which the claimant can establish that her decision to
forego market opportunities was in fact financially rational."
Ellman's second rule addresses perhaps the most pivotal issue
that would face judges applying the theory in actual divorce
adjudication-how to measure a claim that has been presumptively
established under the first and second principles. According to
Rule 2.2, "[tjhe claimant spouse is ordinarily entitled to recover the
full value of her lost earning capacity."'" This full value rule is
an inevitable consequence of the stated purpose of the alimony
award itself, that is, "to free spousal decisions about the conduct of
marriage from distorting market pressures."'" Since the market
assigns no worth to the wife's marital investment, an alimony rule
measured by the full value of the earning capacity she would have
generated if she had remained in the job market would represent
the most equitable way to reallocate both the disproportionate risks
the wife faces during marriage and the disproportionate losses she
incurs at divorce."6  Simply put, Rule 2.2 seeks to "put[] [the
wife] where she would have been if she had not married, in terms
of her earning capacity."' 67
163. It would seem that such a decision could qualify as financially rational only
when its effects confer an economic benefit on the husband, and consequently
could be expected to generate some increase in aggregate marital income. Ellman
offers two such examples. First, a wife would be entitled to a remedy under Rule
2.1 where "the couple might rationally decide that [she] can make a substantial
contribution to her husband's business by assisting him in some unpaid capacity
rather than entering the labor market." Id. at 63. Ellman is careful to note,
however, that if such a wife were to be awarded a share of the business under
controlling marital property law, an alimony award would be inappropriate as it
would result in "double counting." I. Second, Ellman offers the "classic
executive wife" as a potentially claimworthy homemaker under Rule 2.1. Such a
spouse traditionally "was thought to enhance her husband's opportunities for
significant corporate advancement through social graces and strategic entertaining.
In such cases, it may well be an economically rational use of her labor to be a
homemaker." IM. at 64 (footnotes omitted).
164. Id. at 65 (capitalization altered).
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 67. It must be noted that Rule 2.2 also contains a "no-gain-no-
claim" proviso; that is, where a wife's marital investment ultimately fails to yield
an increase in overall marital income, she will be ineligible for an alimony remedy.
Thus, sharing behavior will give rise to compensable losses only where it is both
rational and successful. See id. at 67-71 for a more in-depth discussion of this
limitation.
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Finally, Ellman sets out his third principle, which operates as
an exception to the second principle and the general measure of
full compensation set out in Rule 2.2. In addition, the no-gain-no-
claim limitation qualifying Rule 2.2 does not apply to claims arising
under the third principle which addresses postmarital losses
incurred by a primary caretaker claimant. Specifically, it provides:
"[t]he homemaker spouse may claim half the value of her lost
earning capacity, even though it exceeds the market value of her
domestic services, when these services included primary responsibil-
ity for the care of children."'" Ellman offers a simple but
convincing example that illustrates why this separate rule is
necessary to distinguish such factual situations from others that
would seem to be controlled by the second principle. Ellman
presents a two-lawyer couple who decide to raise a family after
each has practiced law for three years. For the next ten years, the
wife assumes the roles of homemaker and primary caretaker,
thereby relinquishing "her place in the partnership track.' '1 69
Were such a couple to divorce, Rule 2.1 would seem to award her
the full value of the difference between her earning capacity at
dissolution and the value of her alternative investment opportunity,
that is, her earning capacity had she remained at the firm and
potentially made partner. As Ellman notes, "[t]hat sum might be
a few hundred thousand dollars annually, perhaps ten or twenty
times the market value of [the wife's] services as a cook, nanny,
and housekeeper."'70
One should certainly pause at the prospect of the law imposing
such an obligation on the ex-husband. Indeed, EUman suggests
that the husband could make a plausible argument that his ex-
wife's accommodations were, under these circumstances, financially
irrational, and that therefore Rule 2.1 should preclude recov-
ery.'7' The argument would be that since "[c]hild care services
could have been purchased for considerably less than [the wife's]
foregone income, ... [h]er decision to stay at home therefore
resulted partly from the spouses' lifestyle preference-a preference
for parental care over purchased care despite the dramatic
difference in cost."'72
168. Id, at 71 (capitalization altered).
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id
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But such an argument, were it to justify denying recovery in
toto, would carry broad societal implications that would prove too
much, and Ellman rejects it in the third principle. He reasons:
The couple's decision to have children is financially irrational in
the first place; no matter what arrangement they make for their
child care, they would have been financially better off without
children. But society relies for its continued existence on
couples who make just this financially irrational choice....
Because of the policy of favoring the continued production of
children and parental care of them ... we do not want to
impose a disproportionate risk of loss on the spouse who cares
for the couple's children. We must instead ensure that the costs
of having children are shared equally after the marriage ends...
. Termination of the marriage cannot terminate the responsibility
of either party to pay his or her equal share of the child care
bill .... Because it is a shared cost, however, the husband is
liable to the wife for only half of her loss [in earning capaci-
ty].173
Yet the third principle also recognizes that ift as happens in
many modem marriages, the husband shares in parental responsi-
bilities, and as a result he, like his wife, suffers a loss in earning
capacity that arises from the care of their children, then "alimony
should equalize that loss on divorce by giving the spouse with the
larger loss an award for one-half the difference in their respective
losses."'74 In addition, the third principle applies only so long as
the children can be said to be of an age that would qualify them as
in need of parental care. Consequently, "the woman who remains
a homemaker even after her children are grown ceases to benefit
from the third principle. She can recover only half the earning
capacity she would have lost assuming she had gone back to work
when the children were grown, whether or not she actually
did."
,175
B. Potential Problems with the Theory
The marital duration has traditionally been a central factor
that courts consider in fashioning support awards.16 Indeed, the
controlling Alaska statute lists the length of the marriage as one
173. Id. at 71-72 (footnotes omitted).
174. Id. at 72.
175. Id. at 73.
176. See UNIF. MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE ACT § 308(b)(4), 9A U.L.A. 348
(1970); see also cases collected in Annotation, Excessiveness or Adequacy of
Amount of Money Awarded as Permanent Alimony Following Divorce, 28 A.L.R.
4th 786, 813-14 (1984).
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determinant of whether a claimant is entitled to alimony.' At
first blush, Ellman's theory would not seem to be in complete
harmony with this traditional element of alimony adjudication, as
neither his governing principles nor operative rules explicitly call
for the length of marriage to influence the amount of the alimony
award. Yet it should be plain that, where a claimant has sacrificed
market prospects in order to advance the earning capacity of her
husband either by accommodating his more lucrative career
opportunities or assuming the role of primary caretaker, there will
be a correlation between the wife's loss in earning capacity and
length of the marriage: "[the] right to recover the full amount of
her lost earning capacity may yield a substantial claim in a long-
term marriage in which the impact on earning capacity is great but
it will provide a smaller claim the shorter the marriage."'"8 As a
result, marital duration will necessarily be a built-in component of
Ellman's compensatory model, but, consistent with the overall
theory, only where the claimant can establish a presumptive
entitlement to recovery:
Where the wife's claim is based on a loss in earning capacity
arising from her performance of domestic obligations, the
amount of her loss will typically increase with the length of the
marriage. In a two-career marriage in which the wife has
incurred no loss in earning capacity arising from sharing
behavior, there will be no claim even though the marriage lasted
for a long time.... Current law, which simply makes the length
of the marriage a factor to consider, offers no explanation for
enhancing the claim in one case but not the other.'
Ellman's framework, then, has the added benefit of offering a
principled justification for why the duration of the marriage should
effect the alimony outcome in the appropriate case.
Finally, Ellman's theory is perhaps vulnerable to the charge
that the element upon which it most depends-the value of the
wife's lost earning capacity-will be the most difficult at which to
arrive. The theory calls for computing such value by determining
"the difference between the earning capacity the claimant would
have achieved if she had invested her time in marketable'skills, and
her actual earning capacity upon divorce,"'" which by its very
nature involves guesswork and speculation. While one might be
177. See ALAsKA STAT. § 25.24.160(a)(2)(A) (1991).
178. Ellman, supra note 48, at 76.
179. Id. at 75.
180. Id at 78.
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tempted, if not forced, to turn to the use of expert testimony to
establish with accuracy the economic consequences of the failed
marital investment, 8' the costs of gathering and presenting such
evidence is likely to be prohibitive for the majority of alimony
claimants. One must therefore search for other more reasonable,
yet reliable alternatives.
Ellman recommends that, in attempting to compute the
hypothetical earning capacity the former wife would have had she
not married, courts can "combine statistical data suggesting average
outcomes in like cases with evidence particular to the claim-
ant."'" The Canadian Supreme Court has also embraced the
doctrine of judicial notice as an aid in this inquiry, by observing
that "the general econoinic impact of divorce on women is a
phenomenon the existence of which cannot reasonably be ques-
tioned and should be amenable to judicial notice."''" At this
juncture, we must perhaps limit our ambitions to outlining the
broader contours of a new conceptual approach, and the suggestion
that courts might have to become more hospitable to reasonable
estimates and probable results. As Ellman himself ultimately
concludes, the potential difficulties are not insurmountable:
Even crude approximations of theoretically defensible criteria
are probably better than intuitive estimates of what is "fair"
under a system lacking established principles of "fairness" in the
first place... In the end, precision is not obtainable. The
determination of alimony claims ... will necessarily depend, at
least in part, upon the rough justice of trial court discretion...
. But we are still better off knowing what we should be doing,
even if we cannot do it perfectly, than not knowing at all."
IV. CONCLUSION
The law of divorce should not aspire to alleviate all the
economic and social dislocations that accompany the breakdown of
a marriage. No theory of alimony could hope to provide principles
that would have easy application to the great diversity of marital
arrangements that presently come before the courts for resolution.
These observations, however, cannot obfuscate the current
shortcomings of Alaska's current alimony regime, especially the fact
181. See, e.g., Krauskopf, supra note 30, at 589; Moge v. Moge, 99 D.L.R.4th
456, 495 (Can. 1992).
182. Ellman, supra note 48, at 79.
183. Moge, 99 D.L.R.4th at 497.
184. Ellman, supra note 48, at 79-80.
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that a strict showing of financial necessity has come to control the
review of alimony cases before the Alaska Supreme Court. The
court should rethink its analysis of how resources are to be
allocated at divorce; conceptualizing alimony as compensation for
loss rather than relief of need offers a promising point of departure
and would set the framework for more equitable and consistent
results. It might also request that the Alaska legislature amend
section 25.24.160(a)(2) and explicitly add "reduced earning
capacity" as a statutory factor to be considered by trial courts in
fashioning just and necessary alimony awards.'8'
Most importantly, alimony must be seen not as a transfer of
the husband's wealth to the wife, but as a reallocation of their joint
wealth that is derived from the choices they made and behavior
they exhibited during marriage. Often alimony claimants do not
simply need support, but are entitled to it, since they have earned
it through investment in the marital unit."s Under the model
advanced here, the former wife would not be asserting a claim to
share beyond dissolution in her ex-husband's enhanced earning
capacity." Rather she would be claiming the right to recover,
through compensatory payments, the value of her own lost earning
capacity sacrificed during marriage.
Rational economic analysis and intuitive equitable consider-
ations compel the conclusion that it is indefensible for "the spouse
who benefitted from the other's lost earning capacity both to leave
the marriage with all the financial gain the parties had initially
expected to share, and to leave the wife with her loss.""1s The
compensatory model would preclude such perverse results and
would also harmonize with the spirit of the new language added to
185. Indeed, the court has explicitly noted that "'[d]iminution in earning
capacity' is not a statutory factor." Ulsher v. Ulsher, 867 P.2d 819, 822 (Alaska
1994).
186. One commentator has observed that because "only the functionally
unemployable are entitled to maintenance on a pure need-based standard,
accepting support can lower the spouse's self-esteem." Rutheford, supra note 21,
at 570. Thus, a further advantage of the compensatory conception of alimony lies
in its potential to remove the stigma that accompanies payments under the needs-
centered model.
187. Such an approach would be akin to awarding the wife traditional contract
expectation damages, where the "benefit of her bargain" would be measured by
"her expected share in the marital profit if the marriage had continued." Ellman,
supra note 48, at 66.
188. Id. at 70-71 (emphasis added).
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Alaska's alimony statute in 1990 that awards should "fairly allocate
the economic effects of divorce."1 9 Finally "while theoretically
defensible principles of alimony cannot be translated into self-
executing adjudicative rules, they can give judges more guidance
than they now have in following a coherent approach."1  By
clarifying what the law should seek to accomplish in making an
alimony award, and why the law should justifiably impose such an
obligation on a former spouse, courts should be better positioned
to determine and explain whether, when and how such awards
should be granted.
Christopher D. Nelson
189. ALASKA STAT. § 25.24.160(a)(2) (1991).
190. Ellman, supra note 48, at 53.
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